This paper analyzes the Name Your Own Price (NYOP) mechanism adopted by Priceline.com. We characterize a customer's equilibrium bidding path under NYOP and show that the expected payo¤ of a customer is weakly higher than that in a …rst-price reverse auction without a reserve price. In addition, we show that Priceline.com's lockout period restriction, a design to protect sellers that seems to hurt customers, can actually bene…t a customer in some circumstances.
Introduction
Priceline.com, known for its Name Your Own Price (NYOP) system, is a website devoted to helping travelers obtain discount rates for travel-related items such as airline tickets and hotel stays. The NYOP mechanism works as follows. First, a customer enters a bid that speci…es the general characteristics of what she wants to buy (travel dates, location, hotel rating, etc.) and the price that she is willing to pay. Next, Priceline.com either communicates the customer's bid to participating sellers or accesses their private database to determine whether Priceline.com can satisfy the customer's speci…ed terms and the bid price. If
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 50 Memorial Drive E52-391, Cambridge, MA 02142. Email: chchen@mit.edu. I would like to thank Glenn Ellison, Bengt Holmstrom, and David McAdams for valuable discussions and suggestions. I also thank Muhamet Yildiz, Sergei Izmalkov, Chyi-Mei Chen, Filippo Balestrieri and seminar participants at MIT for helpful comments. a seller accepts the bid, the o¤er cannot be cancelled. If no seller accepts the bid, the customer can rebid either by changing the desired speci…cations or by waiting for a minimum period of time, the lockout period, before submitting a new, higher price o¤er. For a hotel, the lockout period is 24 hours, for rental cars it is three days and for an airline ticket seven days. Priceline says in its seller's guideline that the rule is designed to protect the sellers. Our analysis suggests that the lockout period may often bene…t the buyer, because it allows the buyer to commit to fewer rounds of bidding (the bidding must end before the date of travel, of course.)
To represent the Priceline.com auction, we use a dynamic model in which a single buyer suggests prices to N potential sellers for a …nite number of rounds.
The number of rounds T determines the length of the lockout period. By letting T go to in…nity, we can also consider the case of no lockout period. For simplicity, we assume that the buyer's valuation is known. The sellers'costs are privately known and independently drawn from a common distribution.
We …rst show that without a lockout period and no discounting, there are two kinds of equilibrium bidding paths. As T goes to in…nity, either sellers are almost fully discriminated over time or they get pooled into a …nite number of cost intervals with bids clustering at the lowest price which is accepted by the seller with the minimum cost. In the latter case, the price pattern is convexly increasing as the buyer keeps her bids close to the price accepted by the minimumcost seller until the very end. The pattern of bidding will be convex and most of trades (if any) will be realized at the end. This is consistent with empirical evidence and similar to the deadline e¤ect observed in many bargaining processes (see for instance Hart (1989) and Spier (1992) on strikes and pretrial negotiation.)
The buyer's bidding strategy in ‡uences the rate at which she learns about the sellers'valuations. Ideally, the buyer would like to commit to a strategy that optimally reveals this information. If she could do that, she would gradually raise the price to price discriminate among the sellers and stop at the optimal reserve price, much like a Dutch auction, but in reverse. But when commitment is impossible, as we assume, the buyer cannot help but respond to the information revealed by rejections. As a consequence, she may want to bid so that her initial bids reveal little information and only at the end will they be more informative.
The last minute rush will lead to pooling and ine¢ cient outcomes, because many sellers will accept simultaneously and the winner will be determined by lottery.
The other equilibrium where sellers are discriminated through a gradually increasing bid sequence is, on the other hand, fully e¢ cient, since the maximum bid equals the highest seller cost and the sellers are almost fully discriminated.
We also show that without a lockout period, the expected payo¤ of a customer is weakly higher than that in a …rst-price sealed-bid reverse auction (where service providers submit their bids to a customer) without a reserve price, but lower than that in a …rst-price sealed-bid reverse auction with the optimal reserve price.
Moreover, when the expected payo¤ is strictly higher than that in a …rst-price reverse auction without a reserve price, the equilibrium bidding path is convexly increasing.
The lockout period, by reducing the number of bidding rounds, a¤ects the process of information revelation. It makes the buyer bid more aggressively early on, because she does not need to be as concerned about the detrimental e¤ects of learning more about the sellers'information while still having many bidding opportunities. This can be especially valuable if the buyer moderately discounts the future, that is, she wants to learn early about bookings. Thus, the lockout period can be advantageous to the buyer, because it permits the buyer to commit to fewer rounds of bidding. However, the welfare e¤ects are ambiguous in general.
The …nding that the lockout period can be valuable is in line with McAdams and Schwarz (2007)'s view that an intermediary can create value by o¤ering a credible commitment device.
Our analysis also provides insights into the unexplained bidding paths found by Spann and Tellis (2006) . They analyze buyers'bidding patterns under NYOP without the lockout period restriction and …nd that 36% of the patterns are concavely increasing, while 23% are convexly increasing. They argue that the concave patterns can be explained by the positive bidding cost, but the convex ones suggest irrational consumer behavior on the Internet. Our paper shows that a convex pattern where a buyer raises bids more aggressively at the end can occur in a fully rational environment.
The environment studied here is similar to a durable goods monopoly, but with the roles of buyer and seller reversed. In a durable goods monopoly, the seller makes bids. Here the buyer does it. To avoid confusion, call the side that determines the price the principal and the other side the agents. There are two di¤erences between our setting and a durable goods monopoly. First, there is a deadline in our environment, which results in very di¤erent equilibrium paths than those of the Coase conjecture. 1 Secondly, there is competition among the agents. With competition, an agent may accept the current price even though the future price path looks attractive, because there is the risk that another agent will accept. Therefore, our model works even when there is no discounting.
Lastly, our paper is closely related to Horner and Samuelson (2009). The two papers are done independently, and both characterize and emphasize the two possible forms of the equilibrium paths. By assuming that the agents'types are uniformly distributed, Horner and Samuelson prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium and explore the relation between the number of buyers and the type of the equilibrium in detail. Our paper, on the other hand, shows that the equilibrium paths must be one of the two types for a large class of distributions including the uniform distribution. We further incorporate discounting and discuss the ine¢ ciency caused by late transactions, an important feature of the type of equilibrium in which the sellers are not almost fully discriminated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents an example that motivates our research. Section 4 constructs an equilibrium. Section 5 characterizes the equilibrium bidding behavior. Section 6 analyzes a model with waiting cost to see under what conditions the lockout period rule bene…ts customers and Section 7 concludes.
The Model
There are N 2 sellers and 1 buyer in the market. The buyer has one unit of demand for the good provided by the sellers. The buyer's reservation value for the good is v, which is known by everyone. Seller i privately knows his cost i to provide the good. Each i is independently and identically distributed on f (x) strictly increases in 1 In Stokey's discrete-time model, she also considers the case when there is a deadline and shows that the Coase conjecture still holds when the length of the period shrinks. The conclusion is di¤erent from ours because in Stocky's model, the deadline is not just the last day to trade, it is also the last day on which a buyer can enjoy the good and derive utility from it. That is, a buyer derives less utility if he gets the good on a day closer to the deadline. In our model, a buyer derives the same utility no matter when he gets the good.
x. A buyer's payo¤ is v b, where b is his payment to the seller, if he gets the object, and 0 otherwise. All the players are risk neutral. The setting is common knowledge to everyone in the market.
There is one platform allowing the buyer to submit his bid price to sellers. The buyer is allowed to adjust his bids for T times. In round t, the buyer announces the bid price, and sellers decide whether to accept or not. If n sellers accept the bid, each of them gets the chance to provide the good with probability 1 n , and the game stops. If no seller accepts and t < T , the process proceeds to the next round, and the buyer submits a new price. If t = T , then the market closes and no further transaction can happen.
Equilibrium concept
The equilibrium concept used in this paper is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. An equilibrium consists of the buyer's strategy and belief, and the sellers' strategies and beliefs. Only symmetric pure strategy equilibria are considered. Let p t be the price that the buyer o¤ers the sellers in round t. Denote by
; p t ) the history of the prices submitted by the buyer in the …rst t rounds.
Let b t (h t 1 ) be the price that the buyer would submit in round t given the price history h t 1 and the fact that no seller accepts in the …rst t 1 rounds.
The buyer's strategy is a set of functions fb t (h t 1 )g T t=1 . A seller's strategy can be summarized by functions fx t (h t )g T t=1 . In round t, given h t , a seller accepts the buyer's o¤er if and only if his cost is less than or equal to x t (h t ). The buyer's and the sellers'beliefs are summarized by a set of functions fy t (h t 1 )g T t=1 , which speci…es the greatest lower bound of a seller's cost believed by the buyer and the other sellers given history h t 1 and the fact that no seller accepts in the …rst t 1 rounds. Denote by u 0 t (b; x j h t 1 ; y t (h t 1 )) the buyer's expected utility given history h t 1 and belief y t (h t 1 ), and u i t b; x i ; x i j h t ; i ; y t (h t 1 ) seller i's expected utility, where x i is the other sellers' strategy, 2 and x i is seller i's strategy, given h t ; the realization i of seller i's cost, and belief y t (h t 1 ).
De…nition 1 A symmetric equilibrium is a (b; y; x) that satis…es 2 x i is a tuple consisting of the other sellers'strategies. But when the other sellers use the same strategies, x i can be a single function without confusion.
(a) y t+1 (h t ) = max fx t (h t ) ; x t 1 (h t 1 ) ; ; x 1 (h 1 )g ; 8t; h t , and
) and u i t b; x; x j h t ; i ; y t (h t 1 ) u i t b; x; x 0 j h t ; i ; y t (h t 1 ) ; 8b 0 ; x 0 ; t; h t ; h t 1 :
Condition (a) implies that players'belief about the greatest lower bound of seller i's cost at time t is the same as the maximum of seller i's costs with which seller i would have accepted a price occurring on the historical price path. Condition (b) means that players cannot do better by deviating from the equilibrium strategy.
An Example
Before proceeding to constructing an equilibrium for the general model, we show calculations for …nding the equilibrium path by using the example where N = 2; v = 1; and F is a uniform distribution on [0; 1], and highlight some interesting points.
In addition to NYOP, a reverse auction is another mechanism commonly used by a buyer to determine allocation. Thus, we are interested in comparing the performances of the two mechanisms. In this example, the reverse auction is analogous to a standard auction with one seller and two buyers whose values are uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. In the standard auction, a buyer with value v bids v 2 in equilibrium. Therefore, in the reverse auction, a seller with cost x analogously submits ask price . On the other hand, if the buyer is allowed to set a reserve price to commit that he buys the object only if the price is lower than the reserve price, then by setting the reserve price at . From the example, we see that for the buyer, NYOP outperforms a reverse auction without a reserve price even when there is only one chance to bid.
T=2:
Next consider the case where T = 2. Suppose that in round 1, the bid price is b 1 and no one buys. In round 2, the buyer believes that both sellers'costs are above x 1 (b 1 ), and each seller also believes the other one's cost is above x 1 (b 1 ).
The updated belief about the distribution of a seller's cost is
it is the last round, both sellers will accept if the bid is higher than their costs.
Given the belief, the buyer will bid at b 2 (b 1 ) = 1
to maximize his expected revenue.
In round 1, suppose the buyer has submitted a bid at b 1 . A seller with cost x decides whether to accept the bid in this round or wait until the next one with the belief that the other seller would accept if his cost is below or equal to x 1 (b 1 ). If the seller accepts in this round, with probability x 1 the other accepts too, and each of them gets to sell with probability 1 2 ; and with probability 1 x 1 , the seller gets to sell for sure, so the seller's expected payo¤ is (b 1
. If the seller waits, with probability 1 x 1 , the game moves to the next round. In round 2, the buyer is expected to submit b 2 (b 1 ).
With probability
, the other seller accepts too and each of them gets to sell with probability 
Note that if a seller with x accepts in round 1, then a seller with x 0 < x would also accept. In equilibrium, a seller with x x 1 (b 1 ) decides to accept, so we can get x 1 (b 1 ) = 1
With belief x 1 (b 1 ), the buyer chooses b 1 to maximize his total expected revenue in the two rounds 
Numerical results:
In the following table, we show the equilibrium paths of x t and b t and the expected buyer's payo¤s when T = 1; 2; 3; 4; and 5. We assume that the game begins at time 0 and ends at time 1. If the buyer's bid in the tth round is accepted, the transaction occurs at
T : Column E ( ) lists the expected transaction time conditional on that transaction occurs. 2. The cost cuto¤ in round T t, x T t , converges when T goes to in…nity.
(proved in Proposition 5)
3. The last-round bid increases in T , but the increment also shrinks as T increases. Observe that given T , the bidding path b t is increasing. But 3 Note that the numbers in the table are not accurate enough to show small di¤erences.
with larger T , the increasing rate is small in the …rst few rounds, and big jumps occur in the last few rounds. (characterized in Theorem 2)
4. The payo¤ for all T is lower than the payo¤ in a reverse auction with the optimal reserve price; and when T is large enough (in this example, when T 1), the payo¤ is higher than the payo¤ in a reverse auction with no reserve price. (proved in Theorem 3)
5. In equilibrium the buyer does not get the object only if both sellers'costs are above x T . Therefore, we know the probability that the buyer gets the object increases in T , but the increment shrinks as T increases. From the table, we see that when T increases from 3 to 4, and to 5, neither the buyer's payo¤ nor the probability that the buyer gets the object increases much.
However, the expected transaction time is much later. This fact suggests that if the buyer has waiting cost and prefers earlier transactions, having fewer rounds might be good for him. The analysis in Section 6 con…rms the conjecture.
Construction of the Equilibrium
In this section, we construct an equilibrium by solving a series of programs backward and prove the existence of the equilibrium.
To construct the equilibrium, we need to introduce more notations. For convenience, de…ne
Note that F (x) strictly decreases in x. Suppose only sellers with costs between x t 1 and x t are willing to provide the good. Let
be the probability that the demand is ful…lled. Let
be the conditional probability that a seller gets to provide the good if he accepts the buyer's o¤er conditional on that the other sellers' costs are above x t 1 . 4 De…ne
; e x t (b t ; x t 1 ) ; and V t (x t 1 ) de…ned below are used to characterize equilibrium strategies, beliefs, and the buyer's payo¤ for the continuation games starting from round t. If t = T , let
and
The constraint b T = x T of the program comes from that in the last round, a seller accepts the last-round bid b T as long as his cost is below b T , so the cuto¤ x T equals b T . Knowing this and given the belief that all the sellers have cost higher than x T 1 , the buyer chooses b T to maximize his payo¤-the objective function. Note that there might be multiple solutions to program P1. If there is more than one solution, only those that ensure the existence of equilibrium can be candidates for b T (x T 1 ) and x T (x T 1 ) (see the proof of Proposition 1 for more details). 4 Conditional on that the other sellers'costs are above xt 1, if a seller accepts the buyer's offer, with probability
N , there are n other sellers accepting, and each of them gets to sell the good with probability
where
where b t+1 (x t ) ; x t+1 (x t ) are de…ned as below;
and let
Note that to solve the round-t program, we must solve all the programs for later rounds …rst, so function C t+1 (x) is determined before solving the program. The right-hand side of the constraint, C t+1 (x t ), is the expected payo¤ of a seller with cost x t if he waits and accepts in the next period. The left-hand side is the expected payo¤ of a seller with cost x t if he accepts in period t. Given b t , sellers with costs lower than x t prefer to accept in period t, and sellers with costs higher than x t prefer to accept in period t + 1. So for each b t , we …nd the sellers' equilibrium strategy x t from the constraint. Given the sellers'strategy and the belief that all sellers'costs are above x t 1 , the buyer chooses b t to maximize his payo¤-the objective function. The following proposition proves that programs P1 and P3 have a solution
Proposition 1 There exists a set of solutions b t (x t 1 ) ; x t (x t 1 ) t that solves program P1 and P3 for all t.
Proof. The details of the proof are in Appendix A. Here is the sketch. First, by Berge's maximum theorem, V T (x T 1 ) is continuous, and the solution set of x T for program P1 is upper hemi-contiuous. Therefore, we are able to pick
Next, substituting the constraint into the objective function in round T 1 in program P3, the objective function is graph-continuous de…ned in Leininger (1984) , and by Leininger's generalized maximum theorem, V T 1 is upper semicontinuous, and the solution set of x T 1 exists and is upper hemi-continuous.
Applying the same procedure backward, we guarantee the existence of a solution to each round-t program.
The following assumption is for de…ning b x t (b t ; x t 1 ) and e x t (b t ; x t 1 ). We make the assumption to ensure the existence of pure strategy equilibrium. 5 Without the assumption, we are still able to construct an equilibrium in which mixed strategies are applied o¤ the equilibrium path. Therefore, Assumption 1 is not necessary for an equilibrium to exist.
and e
5 Assumption 1 implies that when the price is not too low, i.e. bt 2 [b; c], there exists xt such that
So a seller with cost lower than xt accepts in round t, and a seller with cost higher than xt accepts in later rounds. Without the assumption, since Ct+1 (xt) might have a jump at some c 2 [c; c], there might exist b such that
In this case, there does not exist xt such that
so we are not able to …nd a cost cuto¤ in round t given that the buyer submits b. One way to solve the problem is to let the buyer play mixed strategies in round t + 1.
For t < T , let
otherwise,
is for determining a player's belief about the greatest lower bound of a seller's cost, so b x t (b t ; x t 1 ) x t 1 ; and e x t (b t ; x t 1 ) is for determining a seller's strategy. The di¤erence between x t (x t 1 ) and b
) is determined at the same time when the buyer determines b t , and b x t (b t ; x t 1 ) (or e x t (b t ; x t 1 )) is determined after the buyer submits b t . When deriving b x t (b t ; x t 1 ) and e x t (b t ; x t 1 ), we have to take care of the cases when the buyer submits o¤-equilibrium bids. If an o¤-equilibrium bid b t is too high, all the sellers accept and b x t = e x t = c. If b t is too low, sellers with values higher than x t 1 do not accept, so the belief about the greatest lower bound of the sellers' costs after all the sellers reject b t is still x t 1 , i.e. b x t = x t 1 . However, a seller with cost lower than b t
G(x t 1 ;x t 1 ) < x t 1 gets higher payo¤ if he accepts in round t, so e
Theorem 1 Assume Assumption 1. Let b t be as de…ned in (P1), (P3), and b x t , e x t be as de…ned in (P4), (P5), and (P6). The following (b; y; x) is an equilibrium of the game.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 1
The equilibrium path f(b 1 ; ; b T ) ; (x 1 ; ; x T )g can be found by solving the recursive program
The value of the program is the buyer's payo¤ in equilibrium.
The program shows that the equilibrium path f(
maximizes the buyer's payo¤ but is subject to two constraints. The …rst one is the sellers'IC constraint, which exists in every mechanism and is shown in the constraint part of the program. The second constraint comes from the recursive form of the program. In each round, the buyer makes his bidding decision based on his current information and is not able to commit to a bidding path at the beginning. The second constraint keeps the buyer from achieving the outcome derived from the optimal mechanism stated by Myerson (1981).
Equilibrium Bidding Behavior
With T chances to submit prices, the buyer is able to segment the sellers in up to T groups according to their costs. However, the buyer cannot commit to a bidding path in advance, and in each round, he will choose a price that maximizes his expected payo¤ based on his belief. Thus, the buyer would su¤er from the inability to commit and get lower payo¤ than when commitment is possible. In this section, we focus on the case when there is no lockout period restriction so that the buyer can submit as many bids as he wants. We …rst show that when committing to a bidding path is impossible, the optimal outcome for the buyer stated by Myerson (1981) is not attainable if the optimal auction design involves setting a reserve price. Next, we characterize the equilibrium bidding behavior and show that there are two possible types of equilibrium bidding paths. One incurs constant trades over time, and the other leads to late transactions.
Commitment and optimality
In this section, we consider the situation when the buyer can commit to a bidding path in advance as a benchmark case. We show that with commitment, the buyer can achieve the optimal outcome realized in Myerson's optimal mechanism.
Note that in our setting, a …rst-price or second-price reverse auction works as follows -sellers submit their asks and the buyer chooses to buy an object from the seller with the lowest ask price. The buyer can announce a reserve price before the auction starts so that the buyer buys the object only if there is at least one ask price below the reserve price. A …rst-price or second-price reverse auction with a reserve price r such that r +
f i (r) = v is an optimal mechanism prescribed by Myerson (1981) . Under NYOP, it is the buyer who submits bids.
When there are a large number of bidding chances, if the buyer commits to raise bids gradually and stop at r, then to the sellers, the game, like a reverse Dutch auction with a reserve price, is almost strategically equivalent to a …rst-price reverse auction with reserve price r, and the optimal outcome for the buyer can be approximately achieved. The following proposition elucidates this point.
Proposition 2 Let (T ) be the buyer's maximum payo¤ when there are T rounds and commitment to a path is possible. Let be the buyer's payo¤ in Myerson's optimal mechanism. Given any > 0, there exists T 0 such that for all T > T 0 ,
Proof. See Appendix B. The proof shows that by committing to a path
T (where r is the optimal reserve price) accept, the buyer's payo¤ can be arbitrarily close to when T goes to in…nity.
However, when commitment is not possible, even though the buyer is allowed to adjust the price as many times as he wants, the maximum payo¤ resulting from the optimal mechanism is not approximately achievable. By corollary 1
and (P1), we know that on the equilibrium path, the last-round b T and x T can be found by solving
A necessary condition for b T is
Suppose the optimal auction involves setting a reserve price r < c. If the optimal auction can be approximately implemented when T goes to in…nity, then it must
, so the optimal auction cannot be approximately implemented.
Proposition 3 When commitment to a path is impossible, the buyer's payo¤ under NYOP is bounded away from the payo¤ in Myerson's optimal auction if the optimal auction involves setting a reserve price.
Possible forms for the equilibrium paths when no lockout period restriction is imposed
In this section, we characterize the pattern of the equilibrium bidding path when T ! 1 (i.e. when there is no lockout period restriction). The question is how the buyer designs a bidding path to discriminate sellers. When commitment is possible, it is optimal for the buyer to induce sellers to reveal information about their costs gradually in every round. But when commitment is impossible, acquiring new information will change the buyer's pricing strategy later on, and it is not clear whether doing so is bene…cial for the buyer. In Theorem 2, we characterize the equilibrium paths. Although the equilibrium paths would be di¤erent in di¤erent environments, we show that the paths can be neatly classi…ed into two types: either the sellers with di¤erent costs are almost fully discriminated so the sellers' private information is revealed gradually over time, or they are pooled in intervals and most information about the sellers'costs is revealed just before the deadline.
Before characterizing the equilibrium paths, we …rst analyze how the buyer's payo¤ changes when the number of rounds increases.
Proposition 4 The buyer's payo¤ increases with T , and the payo¤ converges when T ! 1.
Proof. When the number of rounds increases from M to M + 1, the buyer can submit price c in the …rst round and then in the remaining rounds, do the same thing as when there are M rounds. Following this strategy, the buyer's payo¤ is the same as when T = M , and he might be able to do better by using other strategies. Therefore, the buyer's payo¤ is weakly increasing with T . Moreover, the buyer's payo¤ is bounded by the payo¤ in Myerson's optimal mechanism, so the payo¤ converges when T ! 1.
Therefore, when the buyer does not have time preference, having more rounds is weakly better for him. We need the following condition for subsequent discussion. For convenience, we denote x t and b t on the equilibrium path when there are T rounds by x T t and b T t . The following proposition shows a convergence property of x T T t when T goes to in…nity.
Proposition 5 Assume Condition 1. lim T !1 x T T t exists for all t 2 f0; 1; g : Proof. Note that given any t and T ,
t+1 ( ) (de…ned in program P3 on page 11). When we increase the number of rounds from T to T + 1,
is concave in xt for any t and T , then Condition 1 holds.
. The following de…nes a cluster point of the cuto¤ set X T when T ! 1. bidding patterns. They argue that with positive bidding cost, the pattern should be concavely increasing because at the beginning, consumers try to increase the probability of successful bidding by bidding higher, but when the bids are closer to their reservation value, the increasing rate slows down; and with zero bidding cost, the pattern should re ‡ect linearly increasing bids. However, the result shows that only 36% of the data …t the …rst pattern and 5% …t the second pattern. 23% of the data …t the pattern which is convexly increasing, so they conclude that consumer behavior on the internet is not so rational. Nevertheless, a convexly increasing pattern corresponds to the case B = fcg in Theorem 2. Thus, a convex path can actually occur in a fully rational environment. 7 In addition to the convex bidding path, the case B = fcg also implies that most transactions occur near the end. This is related to the deadline e¤ect that has been observed in many negotiation processes such as bargaining during strikes and pretrial negotiation.
Our model thus provides insight into this phenomenon.
Factors that a¤ect the type of the equilibrium path
What would happen on the equilibrium path depends on the distribution of the sellers'cost F , the buyer's value v, and the number of sellers N . Under NYOP, the buyer is allowed to set up a price path so that lim T !1 b T T = lim T !1 x T T < c, which functions as a reserve price. But since there is no commitment, to
, and this requirement incurs some costs. First, the buyer has to charge the same price for sellers between x t and x t 1 , and hence sellers receive more information rent than when fully discriminated. Furthermore, sellers in [x t ; x t 1 ) get to sell the good with the same probability. Hence, the allocation is not e¢ cient under NYOP. If the bene…t dominates the loss of having lim T !1 b T T < c, the equilibrium path will lead to lim T !1 b T T < c. One thing that deserves mention is that when the bene…t of having a reserve price is large enough, in order to attain lim T !1 b T T < c, the buyer has to restrict himself from getting too much information about sellers' costs. Supposing he raises bids early so that sellers with higher cost also accept, once the bid is rejected, he believes that sellers'costs are above a higher threshold and will raise bids further in the next rounds. In the end, lim T !1 b T T = c. Therefore, he has to keep the bids low most of the time and his belief about sellers'costs does not change much until the last few rounds; and since he only has a few chances left, he cannot raise bids to c, so lim T !1 b T T < c. The following proposition provides some means to check whether lim T !1 b T T < c or lim T !1 b T T = c.
Proposition 6
If lim T !1 x T T = c, there does not exist a …nite number M such that the buyer's expected payo¤ when there are M rounds is higher than that in a …rst-price reverse auction without a reserve price.
Proof. If the buyer's payo¤ when T = M is higher than that in a …rst-price reverse auction without a reserve price, by Proposition 4, the buyer's payo¤ when T ! 1 is weakly higher than when T = M . Hence, by the third statement of 
Payo¤ comparison among di¤erent mechanisms
The proposition and the theorem give insights into why Priceline.com has to limit bidding chances within a period of time. Suppose travelers realize their demand for a hotel room M days in advance. If allowed to submit bids many times a day, under some circumstances, travelers would not submit serious bids until the last day, and so successful transactions only occur on the day just before the trip.
This would somewhat inconvenience the hotels and travelers. If only one bid is allowed a day, then transactions will occur much earlier, but the negative impact on travelers'payo¤ is in…nitesimal. This intuition is formalized and analyzed in the next section.
Based on the analysis above, we can also characterize the buyer's payo¤ with di¤erent equilibrium paths and obtain an upper bound and a lower bound for the buyer's expected payo¤ under NYOP.
Theorem 3 When T ! 1, if on the equilibrium path, lim T !1 b T T = lim T !1 x T T < c; the buyer's expected payo¤ is strictly greater than that in a reverse auction without a reserve price. Thus, when T ! 1, the buyer's expected payo¤ is between the payo¤ in a reverse auction without a reserve price and the payo¤ in a reverse auction with the optimal reserve price.
Proof. Note that when T ! 1, a path that almost fully discriminates sellers and satis…es sellers' IC constraint is a feasible solution candidate to program P7 (it is the stationary solution to program P7 when T = 1, see Appendix B, Proposition 9) and it brings the buyer almost the same expected payo¤ as in a reverse auction with no reserve price. Therefore, if the solution to program P7 is the path with lim T !1 b T T = lim T !1 x T T < c, it must yield a higher value for the program than in a reverse auction with no reserve price. This proves the …rst statement. The second statement follows from Theorem 2, Proposition 3, and the …rst statement.
We can consider the mechanism used in Hotwire.com as a …rst-price reverse auction without a reserve price. Hotels submit their prices to Hotwire.com, and Hotwire.com picks the lowest one and announces it on the website. Customers see the price and decide whether to buy or not. Therefore, we should expect that customers get higher expected savings under NYOP.
Model with Buyer' s Waiting Cost
At Priceline, when a bid is rejected, a customer has to wait for a period of time to submit another bid, but some other NYOP websites in Europe allow customers to rebid immediately once their bids are rejected. In this section, we examine the conditions under which having the lockout period restriction bene…ts customers.
The model and an example
We modify the model in Section 2 to …t the real environment better. In reality, buyers would like to pin down their travel plans as early as possible, so late transactions actually incur some waiting costs. Therefore, we incorporate buyers' waiting cost and show that setting an appropriate lockout period rule may bene…t the buyer. However, we assume that sellers have no preference for early or late Buyer's Payo¤ Compared to the result when = 1, we see that a buyer with waiting cost trades more eagerly. However, he would still like to have x 5 much lower than c to serve as a reserve price, so he has to suppress his intention to induce early transaction and cannot raise bids too fast. With the con ‡ict, the table shows that allowing two bidding chances yields the highest payo¤ for the buyer. Having more rounds causes delay, which is costly to the buyer. The example illustrates that the lockout period rule which puts restriction on the buyer's bidding chances might actually help the buyer.
Equilibrium bidding path with no lockout period and < 1
When = 1, we show in Section 5.2 that when there is no lockout period, there are two possible equilibrium paths -either sellers are almost fully discriminated over time or they get pooled into some cost intervals. In the latter case, the price pattern is convexly increasing, and most of trades will be realized at the end. In this section, we show that with < 1, there is one more possible path along which sellers with costs below some level are almost fully discriminated and sellers with costs above the level are pooled in intervals.
First, let
for t < T . We need Condition 2 and Condition 3 for subsequent discussion.
Condition 2
Assume that F is such that x T t (x t 1 ; ) is continuous in x t 1 on [c; c] for all t and T .
Condition 3
Assume that F is such that for any T , k, and x 2 [c; c], x T T k (x; ) converges to x T T k (x; 1) when T goes to in…nity.
Note that x T T k ( ; 1) is independent of T . If the distribution F is uniform on [c; c], it can be proved that Condition 2 and Condition 3 hold. 8 Proposition 7 Assume Conditions 2 and 3. Given , lim T !1 x T T k exists for all k 2 f0; 1; g :
The following theorem is a companion of Theorem 2, which characterizes the equilibrium path given 2 (0; 1] when there is no lockout period. The cluster point set B is de…ned on page 18. 8 Given , if
is concave in xt for any t and T , then Condition 2 holds. If
is concave in xt for any t and T , then Condition 3 holds. Figure 2 shows that a decreases in . The di¤erence comes from the fact that with < 1, after several rounds, some waiting cost has been sunk and the remaining time left before the deadline is shorter. It is as if the buyer now has a higher discount factor, so the buyer's bidding behavior changes accordingly. We can see from Figure 2 that with lower , the path is more concave at the beginning since the buyer is more eager to get the good. As time passes by and less time is left, the path turns convex.
Optimal lockout period
In this section, we use some numerical examples to study the pros and cons of the lockout period rule and characterize the circumstances under which setting an appropriate lockout period increases the buyer's payo¤.
With a discount factor lower than 1, the example in Section 6.1 shows that the buyer's payo¤ does not monotonically increase with the number of rounds, which contrasts to the result in Proposition 4. 2 (0; 1) , the buyer's payo¤ might not monotonically increase with the number of rounds T .
Proposition 8 With
The following discusses how a lockout period rule a¤ects the buyer's payo¤ given di¤erent values of . We focus on the settings in which Myerson's optimal mechanism involves setting a reserve price. If setting a reserve price is unnecessary, having more rounds always bene…ts the buyer because it helps the buyer discriminate the sellers better and be able to close the transaction earlier.
With high discount factor When the discount factor is high but lower than 1, if there is no lockout period, in equilibrium, the path of x t is convex (see Figure   2 ), the last-round price is lower than c, and most transactions occur late. If there is a lockout period, the buyer has fewer bidding chances and will bid seriously from the beginning, so transactions occur earlier. However, the buyer also loses chances to discriminate sellers with cost around c.
With low discount factor When the discount factor is low, if there is no lockout period, the buyer raises the bid aggressively, and the bidding path is concave. With a lockout period, the buyer cannot raise the bid all the way up to c, so there is a reserve-price-like e¤ect. But the lockout period limits the buyer's bidding chances so that the buyer cannot discriminate the sellers well, and it also prevents the buyer from bidding aggressively and getting the good early. The result shows that setting a lockout period so that the buyer has two bidding chances maximizes the buyer's payo¤ when = 0:95 and 0:9. With = 0:95, when there is no lockout period, lim T !1 x T < 1, so the equilibrium path of x t is mostly convex, and transaction is very likely to occur late. By setting a lockout period, the buyer bene…ts from having early transactions but su¤ers from not being able to discriminate sellers with costs around c. With = 0:9, when there is no lockout period, lim T !1 x T = 1, so the equilibrium path of x t is concave, and transactions occur early. By setting a lockout period, the buyer bene…ts from having a last-round price lower than c, which functions like a reserve price, but su¤ers from not being able to close transaction early and discriminate sellers …nely. In these two cases, the bene…t of having a lockout period dominates the loss. However, with very close to 1 and lower than 0:85, the loss dominates the bene…t, so setting a lockout period hurts the buyer.
In addition, setting a lockout period can be valuable for the buyer when having a reserve price bene…ts the buyer a lot. Consider another example where v = 1 and the other parameters are the same as before. The optimal reserve price is 0:5. In this case, if is lower than 0:62, lim T !1 x T = 1, so the buyer's payo¤ when there is no lockout period is at most 1 3 , the payo¤ in a reverse auction with no reserve price. On the other hand, the buyer's payo¤ when only one bidding chance is allowed is 0:3849 for all . Therefore, setting a lockout period bene…ts the buyer if < 0:62. (It also bene…ts the buyer for higher values of .)
From the discussion above, we see that NYOP websites with di¤erent designs of rebidding rules are preferred by di¤erent kinds of customers. Priceline's lockout period rule seems to hurt customers by restricting their rebidding opportunities, but in fact, a customer with waiting costs might …nd it bene…cial.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the Name Your Own Price (NYOP) mechanism adopted by Priceline.com. We characterize the buyer's and the sellers'equilibrium strategies and show that Priceline.com's lockout period restriction, a design to protect sellers that seems to hurt customers, can actually bene…t a customer with moderate discount factor.
We show that when there is no lockout period and no waiting cost, the equilibrium paths can be categorized into two classes. In the …rst class, the cluster point set of the sellers'cost cuto¤s in all rounds is the whole cost interval [c; c], which implies that sellers with di¤erent costs are almost fully discriminated and information about sellers'cost is revealed gradually over time. In this case, the buyer raises bids constantly, the ending price is the highest possible cost c, and the buyer's payo¤ is approximately the same as the payo¤ in a reverse auction without a reserve price. In the second class, the cluster point set is a single point fcg, which implies that sellers with di¤erent costs are pooled in intervals except the one with the lowest possible cost, and information about the sellers'cost is barely revealed in the …rst many rounds. In this case, the buyer does not raise the bid much until the very end, the ending price is lower than c, and the buyer's payo¤ is greater than the payo¤ in a reverse auction without a reserve price. In 
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. There exists a set of solutions b t (x t 1 ) ; x t (x t 1 ) t that solves program P1 and P3 for all t. In the last period, recall that
By Berge's maximum theorem, we know V T (x T 1 ) is continuous and
is upper hemi-continuous. In period t; t < T; let
We show that by picking a proper x t (x t 1 ) from X t (x t 1 ) ; t T , each round-t program has a solution.
First observe that for upper hemi-continuous correspondence X T , we are able to …nd n T closed intervals [a k ; a k+1 ] ; k = 1;
[c; c], and n T continuous functions
C T is lower semi-continuous and V T is continuous, so T 1 is upper semi-continuous.
Note that T 1 is graph-continuous with respect to , which is de…ned in Leininger (1984) . So by Leininger's generalized maximum theorem, V T 1 is upper semicontinuous, and X T 1 is upper hemi-continuous.
Similarly, since X T 1 is upper hemi-continuous, we are able to …nd n T 1
closed intervals a 0 k ; a 0 k+1 ; k = 1;
C T 1 is lower semi-continuous and V T 1 is upper semi-continuous, so T 2 is upper semi-continuous. Check that T 2 is graph-continuous with respect to .
Applying the same procedure, we conclude that there exists a set of solutions b t (x t 1 ) ; x t (x t 1 ) t that solves program P1 and P3 for all t.
Proof of Theorem 1. First we show that u i t b; x; x j h t ; i ; y t (h t 1 ) Seller i with cost i > p T gets negative expected payo¤ if accepting and 0 if not, so he would not accept. Therefore, he should follow x. For t < T , let
In the continuation game, after b t is submitted, the price path (b t+1 ; b t+2 ; ; b T ) and the belief path (y t+1 ; y t+2 ; ; y T ) = (x t ; x t+1 ; ; x T 1 )
can be found by solving programs (P3) and (P5 
. . .
On the other hand, if t s 0 < s, applying similar arguments,
). For any t and any h t 1 , given x, the buyer's optimal strategy must generate the path that maximizes his conditional utility
That is, the strategy b is consistent with the solution (p t ; ; p T ) derived from (P10) in the sense that b t (h t 1 ) = p t ; b t+1 (h t 1 ; p t ) = p t+1 ;
: Under our construction of x t (h t ), the solution to (P10) is the same as (b t ; ; b T ) derived from (P2). Hence the strategy b constructed from (P2) is consistent with (p t ; ; p T ) and is optimal.
B Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Let r be the optimal reserve price. Submitting a path (b 1 ; b 2 ; ; b T ) so that in round t, sellers with cost below x t = c + t r c T accept, is a feasible choice. We show that the buyer's payo¤ with the path can be arbitrarily close to when T goes to in…nity.
Given the path, in the last round, sellers with cost below r accept, so b T =
x T = r. In round t, t < T , a seller with cost x t feels indi¤erent between accepting now or accepting in the next round, so the following constraint holds:
If x t+1 x t and b t+1 b t are small, an approximation of the equation is
In a reverse Dutch auction with reserve price r, a seller with cost x accepts at price
which is also the price submitted by a seller with cost x in a …rst-price reverse auction with reserve price r.
By the Riemann-Stieltjes integral, for all > 0, there exists 0 > 0 such that for all
Therefore, for any min 0 ; 00 , i.e. for any T r c minf 0 ; 00 g ;
The buyer can do weakly better by choosing a better path, so (T ( )) < :
Proof. It is easy to check that
For any x t , x t 1 , and
satis…es single crossing property of marginal returns. By
We use Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 to prove Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, and use Lemmas 5, 6, and 4 to prove Theorem 2. We sometimes add superscript T to V t (x) and C t (x) (de…ned in (P2)) for clari…cation. Note that for two sets (t; T ) and (t 0 ; T 0 ), 
does not depend on T . Proof. Given any t, T such that where T t = k and given belief x t 1 , the continuation equilibrium x t and b t are derived from
From (2),
The solution fx t ; b t g must satisfy the …rst order condition
Note that
Plugging into (3), we get
and so by (6) ,
i is strictly positive. Condition 1 implies that c k (x) is continuous on [c; c], and c 0 k (x) exists almost everywhere and is bounded. Therefore, by (6) , if x t+1 x t > 0,
x t x t 1 > 0. Moreover, the di¤erence between x t 1 and x t only depends on x t , ( = x t+1 x t ), and k.
Lemma 3 Assume Condition 1. In a continuation game starting from round t (t < T 1) with the belief that the greatest lower bound of a seller's cost is x t 1 , when the number of rounds left in the continuation game goes to in…nity, x t ! x t 1 on the continuation equilibrium path but x t 6 = x t 1 .
Proof. In the continuation game, the equilibrium path fx g t T and fb g t T are derived from program P11. As T ! 1, the value of the program converges, so the additional payo¤ a buyer can get by adding one more round goes to 0. In the following proof, we show that when one more round is added to the continuation game, the additional payo¤ the buyer can get does not go to 0 as T ! 1 if there exists > 0 such that x t > x t 1 + for all T . Since the buyer's payo¤ must converge, when T ! 1; x t ! x t 1 :
Let fx ; b g t T be the equilibrium path when there are T t rounds left, which can be derived from program P11. If we add a constraint x t = x t 1 to P11 and let fx 0 ; b 0 g t T be the solution to the program, then the buyer's payo¤ and fx 0 ; b 0 g t+1 T would be the same as those in the continuation game with T t 1 rounds. The value of the program is V t (x t 1 ) = v b Therefore, if x 0 t+1 > x 0 t + , increasing the number of rounds from T t 1 to T t strictly increases the buyer's payo¤, and the additional payo¤ does not go to 0 as T ! 1.
Lemma 4 Given any T and t < 1, if x T T t < c, then x T T < c and x T T x T T 1 > 0. Proof. When t = 1, by (1), x T T < c and x T T x T T 1 > 0. When t = 2, if x T T 1 = c, then x T T = c and the buyer pays for the good at a price higher than or equal to c, which cannot happen in equilibrium. Therefore, x T T 1 < c, and we can apply the result we get in the case when t = 1.
Applying the same argument to the case where t = 3; 4; , we can conclude that, for any t, if x T T t < c, then x T T < c and x T T x T T 1 > 0.
Recall that B is the set of cluster points, and T t = a, we can rewrite the necessary condition (6) for the optimality problem as
f (x) dx , and an approximation of equation (7) is
Since dx and dx + are arbitrarily small, the equation implies C 0 (x) = N F (x) N 1 for x 2 [c; a).
However, lim x!a+ C 0 (x) 6 = N F (x) N 1 . If lim x!a+ C 0 (x) = N F (x) N 1 , in order to satisfy equation (7), there exists > 0 such that for x 2 (a; a + ), dx 2 O (dx + ) but dx = 2 o (dx + ). 9 So (a; a + ) B, a contradiction. Since
is not continuous at a, and dx and dx + can be arbitrarily small, the necessary condition (7) Proposition 9 A path that fully discriminates sellers is a stationary solution to program P7 when T = 1.
Proof. If the buyer fully discriminates sellers, we can rewrite the necessary condition (6) for a stationary solution as
where dx is a positive number which can be arbitrarily small. Note that
N can be considered as the information rent given to a seller with cost x. In our setting, in an incentive compatible mechanism that fully discriminates sellers with di¤er-ent costs, the information rent R (x) has the property that R 0 (x) = F (x) N 1 , so C 0 (x) N = F (x) N 1 . Therefore, the necessary condition holds. Given x t 1 , supposing x t+1 x t is arbitrarily small, one can check that the objective function of (P11) is concave in x t . Therefore, a path that fully discriminates sellers is a stationary solution.
for < 1. However, Lemma 6 might not hold with < 1. By Lemma 5, the …rst statement of Proposition 4 is proved. For the second statement, if lim T !1 x T T < c, it must be that a < c. On the other hand, if a < c, there exists t < 1 such that c lim T !1 x T T t > 0. By Lemma 4, lim T !1 x T T < c:
